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Abstract Agent-based electronic commerce is known to offer many advan-
tages to users. However, very few studies have been devoted to deal with
privacy issues in this domain. Nowadays, privacy is of great concern and pre-
serving users’ privacy plays a crucial role to promote their trust in agent-based
technologies. In this paper, we focus on preference profiling, which is a well-
known threat to users’ privacy. Specifically, we review strategies for customers’
agents to prevent seller agents from obtaining accurate preference profiles of
the former group by using data mining techniques. We experimentally show
the efficacy of each of these strategies and discuss their suitability in different
situations. Our experimental results show that customers can improve their
privacy notably with these strategies.
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1 Introduction
Privacy is of great concern in the era of global connectivity, in which everything
is inter-connected anytime and anywhere, with more than 2 billion world-wide
users with connection to the Internet as of 20111. In the real world, everyone
decides (at least implicitly) what to tell other people about themselves. In the
digital world, users have more or less lost effective control over their personal
data. Users are therefore exposed to constant personal data collection and pro-
cessing without even being aware of it [17]. In this way, Garfinkel [18] suggests
that nowadays users have only one option to preserve their privacy: becoming
hermits and not using e-commerce sites, online social networks, etc. However,
considering the increasing power and sophistication of computer applications
(mainly due to new information technologies such as agent-based technologies)
that offer many advantages to individuals, becoming a hermit may not really
be an option. However, all of these advantages currently come at a significant
loss of privacy [6].
Agent-based electronic commerce refers to electronic commerce in which
agent technologies are applied to provide personalized, continuously running,
semi autonomous behaviour [14]. Many studies have been made on this topic
during the past two decades [19]. However, to our knowledge, privacy is seldom
considered in agent-based e-commerce applications. This leads to applications
that invade individuals’ privacy, causing concerns about their use. Indeed,
recent studies show that 90% of users are concerned or very concerned about
privacy [63]. Moreover, almost 95% of web users admitted they have declined
to provide personal information to web sites at one time or another when
asked [24]. Thus, it is crucial for Multi-agent Systems to consider privacy in
order to be of wide use [45]. This can potentially promote principals’ trust in
agent-based technologies. This trust is needed for principals to be willing to
engage with and delegate tasks to agents [14].
Two information-related activities can represent a major threat for pri-
vacy: information collection and information processing [39]. These activities
can lead to many privacy breaches [50,55]. Information collection refers to
the process of gathering and storing data about an individual. Personal data
is transferred on-line even across the Internet. Without appropriate protec-
tion mechanisms a potential attacker could easily obtain information about
principals without their consent. In order to avoid undesired information col-
lection, sensitive personal information must be protected from access by any
other third party that is different from the agent to which the information is
directed to. Therefore, avoiding information collection requires security to con-
trol the access to personal information [36]. Current security-concerned Agent
Platforms avoid undesired information collection for the messages exchanged
by the agents running on top of them. For instance, Jade [25], Magentix [54],
Magentix2 [57], AgentScape [38], SECMAP [60], Tryllian ADK [65], Cougaar
[34], SeMoA [41], and Voyager [40] are security-concerned APs. These Agent
1 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
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Platforms allow the encryption of messages before transferring them and the
decryption of messages once they are received. As a result, if an agent A sends
a message to an agent B using these technologies, A is sure that B will be the
only one able to read this message.
Avoiding undesired information collection is a necessary condition to pre-
serve privacy, but it is not sufficient. It prevents unauthorized third parties
from accessing undesired information. If an agent A sends personal informa-
tion to an agent B in a confidential fashion, external third parties will not
be able to access it. However, agent B will obviously receive this personal in-
formation. The point is that agent B can then process the received personal
information, unless specific measures for preventing information processing are
adopted before sending this information [53].
Information processing refers to the use or transformation of data that have
already been collected [52], even though this information has been collected
by mutual consent between two parties. An example of information processing
is profiling [22,13]. As stated in [22], profiling is “the process of ’discovering’
patterns in data that can be used to identify or represent a human or nonhu-
man subject (individual or group) and/or the application of profiles (sets of
correlated data) to individuate and represent an individual subject or to iden-
tify a subject as a member of a group (which can be an existing community
or a discovered category) and/or the application of profiles to individuate and
represent individuals or groups”.
One of the most common types of profiling is called preference profiling
(also called buyer profiling) in e-commerce environments [62,47], in which
sellers obtain detailed profiles of their customers and tailor their offers regard-
ing customers’ tastes. Indeed, much of the agent-based e-commerce literature
has been precisely focusing on processing customers’ information to achieve
more effective negotiation strategies from the point of view of the seller [4,8,
23,2]. All these approaches try to construct a detailed profile of the customer
so that sellers can tailor their offers based on customers’ tastes. These pro-
files can represent a serious threat to privacy. For instance, these profiles can
be used to perform price discrimination [35]. Vendors could charge customers
different prices for the same good according to the customers’ profiles, i.e., if
a seller knows that some good is of great interest to one customer, the seller
could charge this customer more money for this good than other customers
for the same good. For instance, in 2000, Amazon started to charge customers
different prices for the same DVD titles [51]. When the story became public,
Amazon claimed that this was part of a simple price test and discontinued this
practice. Another example of privacy threat due to the use of these profiles
is what is known as poor judgment [49]. This is when individuals are judged
and subsequently treated according to decisions made automatically based
on incorrect or partial personal data. For instance, companies usually divide
their potential customers into similar groups based on customers’ characteris-
tics (known as customer segmentation). This practice can lead to exclusion of
people from services based on potentially distorted judgments [52].
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In this article, we focus on strategies for avoiding preference profiling in
agent-based e-commerce scenarios. Specifically, these strategies can be applied
by customers’ agents that participate in agent-based e-marketplace to mini-
mize the chances for sellers to perform successful information processing ac-
tivities. Most of these strategies are based on the use of pseudonyms2 and on
different approaches for using/reusing/changing them. Specifically, six strate-
gies are considered: the use of a unique pseudonym, a pseudonym per negoti-
ation, a pseudonym change if model accurate enough, the use of a pseudonym
per group, a pseudonym per preference, and introducing fake preferences. We
experimentally illustrate the efficacy of these strategies in a case study of a
wine trade system. Moreover, in a similar fashion, a customer can check the
improvement in the privacy given by a specific strategy reviewed in this pa-
per since she knows not only the requests happened in previous conversations,
but also the set of future possible requests according to her preferences. The
experimental results show that these simple strategies can evade the capacity
of building a good preference model3 (i.e., a model to predict if a product
is wanted or unwanted by a customer according to her specific preferences)
by using data mining techniques such as decision trees, rule-based classifiers,
naive Bayesian classifiers, and multilayer perceptrons [64].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
some related works. Section 3 presents our formal framework and how agents
can build and evaluate preference profiles according to our formal framework.
Section 4 review strategies for avoiding preference profiling. Section 5 describes
the experiments we conducted and section 6 discusses the results obtained.
Finally, section 7 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Related Work
Agent-based e-commerce has received much attention in the last two decades
[14]. This is due to the fact that agent-based e-commerce offers many advan-
tages with respect to traditional e-commerce, such as (semi-) autonomous be-
haviour so that agents perform transactions on behalf of their users [5]. There
have been many studies in the agent-based e-commerce research field that deal
with the problem of obtaining accurate models (or profiles) of customers’ pref-
erences. For instance, Hindriks and Tykhonov [23] present a generic framework
based on Bayesian learning to learn preference models from opponent informa-
tion. Buffett and Bruce [8] introduce a classification technique to approximate
opponent’s preferences over the domain of possible offers. Aydog˘an and Yolum
[4] propose a learning algorithm to build a preference model to understand
2 A pseudonym is an identifier of a subject other than one of the subject’s real names [37].
Pseudonyms have been broadly used by human beings in the real world. For instance, in
the 19th century when writing was a male-dominated profession, some female writers used
male names for their writings. Nowadays, in the digital world, there are a great number
of pseudonyms such as usernames, nicknames, e-mail addresses, sequence numbers, public
keys, etc.
3 In this paper, we use the terms preference profile and preference model indistinctly.
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consumer’s needs and to offer services that respect consumer’s preferences.
Serrano et. al explore the use of data mining techniques [42], social network
analysis [44], and graph theory [43]; to obtain theories which explain agents’
interactions and their preferences. The studies presented above are aimed at
using such preference profiles to have capital information about customers dur-
ing negotiations with them. In particular, these studies are aimed at having
preference models about customers to be able to adopt more effective nego-
tiation strategies that can directly lead to revenue increases. However, these
increases in revenue for sellers will be at the expense of customers’s budget.
That is, if a seller knows customers’ preferences, the seller can take advantage
of this to propose the deals that are most beneficial to her. The seller can take
advantage of this in many different ways as stated in the introduction. For
instance, if the seller knows that a product is your favourite she could charge
more for this product to you (because she knows you will buy it anyway) than
to other customers. Another example would be that the seller only offers a
customer the most expensive product from all of the products she knows a
customer likes. In order to put customers in a less imbalanced position dur-
ing the negotiation, it is crucial that her preferences are hidden as much as
possible.
Apart from being able to hold privileged information during negotiations,
sellers could also use customers’ profiles to perform tailored advertising (e.g.,
providing suggestions for products that customers may like) or personalise
product searches. This could indeed be seen as beneficial for users. Neverthe-
less, recent studies show that most users reject tailored advertising. A survey
done in 2009 considering 1000 US adult citizens that are internet users found
that 86% reject this practice [59]. Another survey made in 2009 considering
3660 US citizens says that only 30% of them would be willing to disclose per-
sonal information like browsing behaviour captured by websites on which they
have registered in order to improve user experience [58]. The results of these
surveys point out that few users are really willing to lose privacy in exchange
of personalisation or tailored advertising.
There have been some efforts in the last decades to minimize profiling. One
of the most important has been the rise of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs) that have focused on preventing profiling, such as privacy-enhancing
identity management [11]. The building block of privacy-enhancing identity
management is Pseudonymity [20], which is the use of pseudonyms as identi-
fiers [9]. In particular, Privacy-Enhancing Identity Management Systems (PE-
IMS) [11,20] are systems that provide users with facilities to support the man-
agement of their pseudonyms (i.e. creation and selection of the pseudonyms
to be used). According to [21], one of the main questions that is relevant for
pseudonyms to avoid profiling is the amount of information that can be gath-
ered by linking the data that have been disclosed under the same pseudonym.
In this way, in [20] the authors point out pseudonyms should be changed from
time to time to avoid profiling. However, there are few proposals of strategies
to prevent profiling. Instead, users are left with the complete responsibility
of deciding when and how they manage their pseudonyms. Moreover, the few
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existing proposals of strategies usually base on generating a new pseudonym
for each new transaction, what is known as transaction pseudonyms [9]. How-
ever, vendors usually try to avoid this kind of strategies by means of different
approaches to achieve customer loyalty such as price discounts, allotment of
points that can be used for future purchases, and so on [31].
Pseudonym-based techniques have also been used in agent technologies.
Users connect to the IntelliShopper agent [33] using a pseudonym to avoid the
link between the profiles that IntelliShopper has about customers and their
real identity. Moreover, users can use different pseudonyms for IntelliShopper
to have separate profiles for separate activities. However, the authors of this
work leave the user with the responsibility for creating their pseudonyms.
Moreover, they do not provide any pseudonym management facility.
There have been other approaches proposing the integration of pseudonyms
into agent architectures and frameworks, such as Van Blarkom et al. [61]. In
this way, Such et al. [56] present a pseudonym management model that has
been implemented into an agent framework [57]. Warnier and Brazier [62]
also present a proposal for supporting pseudonym management in an agent
framework. Both proposals include the necessary mechanisms for agents to
be able to manage their pseudonyms automatically but nothing is said about
when a pseudonym should be changed or not, as pointed out in [55]. In this
paper, we review strategies for agents to avoid preference profiling based on
the use of pseudonyms.
3 Formal Framework
3.1 Agent Negotiation and Agents Preferences
In this section, we define a generic negotiation protocol that is described in
figure 1. A customer requests a product with a message request that can be
answered with a message model (product requested available), alternative (al-
ternative to requested product is offered), or not offer (negotiation aborted by
the seller). The messages model and alternative can be answered with a mes-
sage accept (accepting the purchase of the product ordered by the customer
or the alternative proposed by the seller), with a message quit (negotiation
cut by the customer) or with a request (the customer makes a new product
proposal to be acquired).
This protocol includes the main elements in a negotiation [48]: the pro-
posal of a product or service and the ability to re-negotiate terms of this
service by both the customer and the seller. There is a large number of nego-
tiation protocols in the literature. Some of them do not include some of the
functionality of this formal framework to make them simpler. For example, a
negotiation implementation can ignore the possibility of iterating [15] or the
counter-offers [15,16] (i.e., the protocol allows only to accept or reject the first
offer). On the other hand, there are negotiation protocols covering more issues
than the choice of product purchased, for example, checking that the product
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m .request
m .model | 
m .alternative |
m .no offer 
m .accept | 
m .quit |
m .request
Fig. 1 Negotiation Protocol.
is indeed the requested [46]. However, this latter group includes the protocol
described in this formal framework and, therefore, the strategies presented can
be applied on them.
The protocol of our formal framework negotiates a type of service or prod-
uct that is specified by a set of terms T = t1, t2, ...tn, where n is the number of
terms known and each term is a triple: term name id, relational operator op,
and value va (e.g., price = low). Without loss of generality, we assume that
the participants in the negotiation know the data type of each term. These
terms T are the content of the messages request and alternative. Of course, the
list of terms is not fixed at any time, hence, both customer and seller can add
a term (increasing the value of n). Associating a protocol with a type of prod-
uct, customers and sellers understand the possible terms of such class of goods.
Limiting the discussion of the proposal to a specific type of product does not
make it less general because different identifiers can be used depending on the
type of product traded in the same protocol of figure 1. Another option is
to extend the protocol with a variable “product” in the messages. Then the
proposal would be reproduced for each value of the variable in isolation.
Let us define the preferences of a customer P as a set of preferred models
Pm that are joined by the logical “or”. Pm is a set of preferred terms pt
that are joined by the logical “and”. And pt preferred terms are triples in
the same format as the terms of service (name of term id, relational operator
op, and value va). More formally, P = {Pm1, Pm2, ...Pm|P |} and Pmi =
{pt1, pt2, ...pt|Pmi|} with 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |. The preferences set P can be viewed as
a disjunctive list of products that the customer wants and the products as a
conjunction of preferred terms. Therefore, an agent might have among their
preferences for the purchase of books:
P = ((price = low) ∧ (year ≥ 2008)) ∨ (author = “Oscar Wilde′′)
which means that the agent is interested in cheap and recent books or
books by a particular author.
To complete the formal framework, let us define the mental processes that
customer agents follow when interacting by the protocol. At the time of launch-
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ing a request, either to initiate the conversation or to iterate in the negotiation,
the customer chooses an element Pmi of P and makes a product request spec-
ifying all the terms known in T satisfying Pmi. In other words, the customer
has general preferences but demands concrete products. The strategies eval-
uated in this paper prevent precisely from giving the general preferences to
the seller. On the other hand, if the seller offers an alternative that meets the
customer’s preferences, in principle, this customer will accept the product even
if it was not what the agent initially asked. Otherwise, the negotiation would
be a simplified case of this formal framework where the seller does not offer
alternatives [15]. The fact that the seller may propose not required alternatives
is what gives the possibility of using information about customer preferences
against this customer (although, even in the simplified case, the seller could
use these preferences to send targeted advertising to the customers). Of course,
the customer has always the freedom to cut a negotiation by the message quit,
even if the seller has offered an acceptable alternative.
Strictly speaking, this is all we need to develop strategies for the protection
of customer preferences: a negotiation protocol, a format for the content of
messages and customers’ preferences, and the mental processes that allow a
customer to use the preferences to request specific products and accept (or
reject) alternatives proposed by the seller. Note that although the role of the
seller has not been defined, it is assumed that the generation of alternatives
considers four factors [4]: availability of product in stock, utility function that
determines the benefit, a function of proximity to provide alternatives similar
to the product requested by the customer, and finally, a preference model that
may have been built based on previous interactions. The next section explains
how to build these preference model.
3.2 Building and evaluating preference models
Regarding the construction and evaluation of preference models, the essential
difference with related works [2,4,8,23], see section 2, is that we adopt the
point of view of the customer. Since the customer knows her real preferences,
the construction and evaluation of these models can be performed by the
interested party to check the efficacy of the strategies evaluated in this paper.
On the other hand, from the point of view of the seller, this test is not feasible
in real life because only a biased viewpoint of customer preferences is known.
Tuples or instances, that constitute the training data for the models, consist
of an attribute for each term in T already known, see section 3. In case that
negotiations do not include a value for a certain term in T , a label is included
to indicate that the value is unknown (“?”), most data mining algorithms
can deal with unknown values. Besides, if a negotiation includes a new term
that has not appeared in previous negotiations, the term is included as a
new attribute and a value of unknown is assigned in the previously generated
tuples. Note that most data mining techniques require an equal number of
attributes (features) for all tuples. Besides, the formal framework specification
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minimizes the chances of an unknown value appears since a customer, despite
having preferences based on specific terms, asks for complete products that
give value to all the terms known by the customer.
In addition to the terms of the product negotiated T , the tuples contain
an additional attribute with the class of the instance. This attribute can take
values of ′+′ and ′−′ to indicate that the instance is a positive example (the
terms define a product or service that a customer wanted) or a negative ex-
ample (defining products that the customer did not want). Considering the
protocol specified in the formal framework, the positive examples are given
by: (1) the terms in the request messages, i.e., the initial one (message m1
in figure 1) or after iterations in the loop (message m7 in figure 1); and (2)
the terms in the messages alternative if a message accept happens after the
alternative. Similarly, a negative example is registered with the terms included
in the messages alternative if a message request occurs after the alternative.
Note that an alternative message followed by a quit is not necessarily a nega-
tive example (a customer can cut the negotiation after receiving an acceptable
alternative, for example because it found a better deal). In summary, consid-
ering a pair of consecutive messages, m1 and m2, and a constructor Instance
having as parameters the terms negotiated and the class of the instance, the
following rules generate the training data set I to build the preference models:
– if(m1.performative = request ∨ (m1.performative = alternative ∧m2.performative =
accept)) then new Instance (m1.content, “+”);
– if(m1.performative = alternative ∧ m2.performative = request) then new Instance
(m1.content, “-”);
Since training data is labelled with a class (wanted or not wanted by the
customer), building a preference model from the training data described above
is a classification problem. Classification is an instance of supervised learning,
i.e. learning where a training set of correctly-identified observations is avail-
able. Section 3.3 explores some suitable classifiers.
Finally, the reliability of the model must be defined. If the preference mod-
els were produced by sellers, the ignorance of the actual preferences would
leave few reliable tools to evaluate these models. The cross validation [64]
can be used to obtain an indicator of the extent to which the model classi-
fies the training data adequately. Nevertheless, a customer can perform this
evaluation more precisely because it knows not only the past instances but
also all possible instances. An evaluation data set composed of an instance for
each preferred model Pmi ∈ P is not enough to assess the model because:
(1) the test data would contain no negative example, therefore, this measure
of reliability cannot detect false positives (a negative example classified as
positive); (2) the preferences admit operators different to ′ =′, and therefore,
it is not possible to create a single instance covering these preferences (e.g.,
year ≥ 2008); and (3) an model “all instances are +” would offer 100% of
accuracy. A more rigorous solution is to analyse the model to decide if it is
logically equivalent to the preferences P . A decision tree, for example, can be
seen as a set of classification rules linked by logical disjunction where each
rule is obtained by joining the nodes on a path of each leaf to the root by the
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conjunction. The obvious flaw in this approach is the computational cost and
the difficulty of establishing this equivalence in some data mining techniques
(e.g., neural networks). The compromise we adopt in this proposal is to gener-
ate a set of test data large enough and composed of: (1) a number of positive
examples for each preferred model Pmi ∈ P which satisfy the terms in Pmi
(i.e., generating possible contents of the message request); and (2) a number
of negative examples for each preferred model Pmi ∈ P whose terms do not
meet any preference in P . The percentage of correctly classified instances is
the degree of accuracy of the model and the objective of this paper is to make
this degree as low as possible. Note that an extremely simple model (e.g, “
all instances are +”) offers a 50% of instances correctly classified with this
evaluation approach.
3.3 Some suitable techniques to build preferences models
This section describes some data mining techniques which are suitable to build
preferences models.
– Decision trees. One of the most popular learning techniques are the decision
trees. A decision tree is a classifier expressed as a recursive partition of
the instance space. These directed trees have a node called root (with
no incoming edges), internal or test nodes (with one or more outgoing
edges), and nodes called leaves or terminals (with no outgoing edges) [64].
Instances are classified by navigating them from the root to a leaf, the leaf
indicates the class and the remaining nodes in the path indicate values of
an attribute in the instance. Therefore, they classify a data set in a tree-
shaped structure where the leaves are the classes and the nodes decide the
value for an attribute. Decision trees algorithms work using a divide-and-
conquer approach. First, an attribute is selected to be the root node and
one branch is generated for each possible value splitting up the instances
into subsets, one for every value of the attribute. Then the process can be
repeated recursively for each branch but considering only those instances
that can reach the branch according to the value of their attributes. The
algorithm stops developing a part of the tree if all instances have the same
classification (same leaf of the tree) [64].
– Classification rules. The antecedent or precondition of a classification rule
is a series of attributes with values assigned, and the consequent or con-
clusion gives the class or classes that are applied to instances covered by
that rule [64]. Preconditions are usually connected by the logic operator
“and”. The different rules of classification are supposed to be connected by
the operator “or”. Therefore, if any rule can be applied, the conclusion of
this rule is given to the instance of the data set. Classification rules can be
easily translated into decision trees: every antecedent of the rule is a node
of the tree with a condition on the path from the root to that leaf, where
the consequent of the rule is the class assigned by the leaf. Classification
rules algorithms work using a coverage approach [64] which means that
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a rule that covers instances in the class is identified (and excludes ones
not in the class), these instances covered are separated, and later the algo-
rithm continues classifying those that are left. As an application example,
Ma´rquez-Vera et al. [32] employ several rules based classifiers and decision
trees to predict student failure at school.
– Bayesian networks as a classifier. Bayes’ theorem shows how to determine
the conditional probability of B given A knowing the conditional prob-
ability of A given B. Bayes’s rule says that if you have a hypothesis H
and evidence E related to that hypothesis, then Pr[H|E] = Pr[E|H]·Pr[H]Pr[E] ,
where Pr[A] denotes the probability of an event A and Pr[E] denotes
the the probability of A conditional on another event B [64]. The Naive
Bayes method assumes, naively, that attributes in a tuple are indepen-
dent given the class. Therefore, if the evidence E is a combination of at-
tributes values (let us split it in pieces of evidence for every attribute: E1,
E2,...En), assuming they are independent, their combined probability is
obtained by multiplying the probabilities. Hence, the probability of giv-
ing a class value h to an instance with the values E1, E2,...En in their
n attributes is: Pr[h|E] = (
∏n
i=0 Pr[Ei|h])·Pr[H]
Pr[E] . Thus, Bayesian networks
can be used as classifier calculating the previous expression for all class
values and returning the class value which produces the maximum result,
i.e. argmaxhP (h|E) [64]. Bayesian networks classifiers are widely used to
construct network intrusion detection approaches [27].
– Multilayer Perceptron. Neural networks are mathematical models inspired
by biological neural networks and consist of set of interconnected artificial
neurons. Neural networks are used to model complex relationships between
inputs and outputs or to find patterns in data. A common type of neural
networks is the so-called feedforward neural networks, where connections
between the neurons do not form a directed cycle. The simplest kind of
feedforward neural network is the single-layer perceptron network, which
consists of a single layer of output nodes that are fed directly from the
inputs via a series of weights. The main weakness of the perceptron is that
it can only solve linearly separable problems. This issue is addressed by the
multilayer perceptron, which connects simple perceptron-like models in a
hierarchical structure so that non-linear decision boundaries can be repre-
sented [64]. The multilayer perceptron consists of three or more layers of
nonlinearly activating artificial neurons. Some application examples are the
use of neural networks to build up a map within an unknown environment
[26] or the financial forecasting [28].
Note that all the techniques discussed are classifiers since the data is la-
belled with a class (wanted or not wanted by the customer). Besides, a dataset
large enough is considered. Therefore, the use of unsupervised, semi-supervised
or one-shot learning algorithms would achieve less accurate preference models.
The comprehensive comparison of the best data mining technique to ob-
tain a preference model is beyond the scope of this paper. Works in this line
[4] have compared the use of sophisticated techniques aimed at learning pref-
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erences (e.g., Candidate Elimination Algorithm reviewable, RCEA) with stan-
dard mining techniques (e.g., ID3 decision tree) concluding that decision trees
obtain the same accuracy when classifying a product as a positive or nega-
tive example. Besides, customers can generate models using all the techniques
available and consider the most accurate model as an indicator of the extent
to which the seller may have learned their preferences.
4 Strategies for Avoiding Preference Profiling
In this section, we present some strategies that customers’ agents can use to
preserve their principals’ privacy. Most of these strategies based on the use of
pseudonyms. Thus, we assume that agents will be running on top of a privacy-
enhancing agent framework that provides pseudonym-management facilities,
such as Magentix2 [57] and AgentScape [62]. We also assume that payments are
carried out using some kind of anonymous payment mechanism and deliveries
are carried out using some anonymous delivery system. Hence, credit card
numbers and delivery addresses do not need to be disclosed when an agent
acquires a product and the only identifiying information from negotiation to
negotiation is the pseudonym used by the customer4. Finally, we also assume
the use of an underlying anonymous communication technology (e.g. TOR
[12]) so that the IP addresses and other whereabouts are hidden.
The reviewed strategies are detailed below:
4.1 Unique pseudonym
The first strategy consists of using a unique pseudonym. The customer’s agent
uses a pseudonym that hides the real identity of its principal (the customer).
However, the customer’s agent never changes its pseudonym and does not use
any other pseudonym. Specifically, in our framework, the customer uses the
same pseudonym for all of the runs of the negotiation protocol. According
to [21], one of the main questions that is relevant for pseudonyms to avoid
profiling is the amount of information that can be gathered by linking the data
that have been disclosed under the same pseudonym. Social security numbers
in the USA are a clear example of a pseudonym that it is usually used for
a long time and in different contexts. This allows different pieces of personal
information disclosed (even in different contexts) to be linked to each other.
This strategy is mainly included for control reasons in the experiments that
we performed and that are detailed in the evaluation section (section 5).
4 For instance, a payment system based on the untraceable electronic cash presented by
Chaum et al. [10] could be used for anonymous payments. For anonymous deliveries, the
privacy-preserving physical delivery system presented by Aı¨meur et al. [3] could be used.
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4.2 Pseudonym per negotiation
In the second strategy, the customer changes its pseudonym to a newly created
one for each new negotiation with the seller. It can be seen as just the oppo-
site to the previous strategy (unique pseudonym for all of the negotiations).
The main aim of this strategy is to make harder for the seller to relate differ-
ent negotiations with the same customer to each other, i.e., the seller could
think that it is negotiating with different customers each time. This strategy
is what is known as transaction pseudonyms in the privacy-enhancing iden-
tity management literature [9]. Moreover, it is usually regarded as the most
privacy-preserving strategy for avoiding preference profiling. However, very
few works try to practically show the real efficacy of this strategy. In the ex-
periments section (section 5) we compare its efficacy to the efficacy of the
other strategies explained in this section.
Vendors usually try to avoid this strategy. They usually conduct differ-
ent approaches to achieve customer loyalty such as price discounts, allotment
of points that can be used for future purchases, and so on [31]. Therefore,
customers may be interested in strategies between Unique Pseudonym and
Pseudonym per negotiation.
4.3 Pseudonym change if model accurate
A strategy that is between Unique Pseudonym and Pseudonym per negotiation
is that of changing a pseudonym before the seller gets an accurate preference
profile. That is, the customer does not use a different pseudonym per nego-
tiation but can reuse the same pseudonym for a number of negotiations, and
then, change this pseudonym before the seller can get an accurate preference
profile.
In this strategy, the customer constructs itself one (or more) preference
model(s) with one (or more) learning technique(s) before a new transaction.
The training data for constructing the preference model are the past nego-
tiations in which the customer used the current pseudonym. The customer
changes its pseudonym for the next negotiation if the preference model con-
structed (or the most accurate one from all of the preference models con-
structed) has accuracy greater than some threshold of tolerance defined by
the customer.
Section 3.2 explains how to evaluate the preference models to obtain the
accuracy in terms of correctly classified instances in the validation phase of the
preference model constructed. Several observations must be explained for this
strategy. (1) As explained in section 3.2, the accuracy is usually greater than
50%, so the threshold should be set above this value. (2) The threshold is not an
upper bound of the accuracy that can be reached by the seller. This is because
the customer verifies the accuracy before starting a new negotiation. Therefore,
if this extra negotiation is long enough, lots of data could be provided and
accuracy over the threshold fixed by the customer could be achieved. (3) This
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strategy is computationally very expensive since it involves the construction
of a preference model for each data mining technique considered and for each
negotiation. There are several possibilities to improve the efficiency: build the
model only after several negotiations, using data mining techniques which can
add information to the model without rebuilding it, etc. (4) The expected
behaviour of this strategy involves sharp declines in the information provided
to sellers corresponding with the moments of change of pseudonym.
4.4 Pseudonym per group
Another possible strategy is for a group of customers to share the same
pseudonym, i.e., to make a coalition. The more customers join the coalition
and the more different their preferences are, the more effective this strategy
should be. This is because there are more chances for the seller to find con-
tradictory preferences, i.e., the seller will find contradictions in the customer’s
favourite products. It could seem that the obvious drawback of this strategy is
that it obtains privacy with regard to sellers sacrificing privacy with regards a
group of customers. However, this should not imply any problem if the group is
composed of customers that trust each other. Moreover, even when customers
do not trust each other there are other solutions — such as using an anony-
mous communication mechanism like TOR [12] that can be added to agent
frameworks as shown in [29] — that will make the seller but also the customers
in the group unable to know which customer bought which product — recall
that we are also assuming that payments and deliveries are anonymous (see
beginning of section 4).
4.5 Pseudonym per preference
Another strategy is to use a different pseudonym for each preference. This is
aimed at splitting the whole preference profile of a customer in many little
preference profiles that only cover a part of the complete customer’s prefer-
ences. For the case of intelligent agents, this strategy was first envisioned by
Van Blarkom et al. [61]. They proposed to place what they called an Iden-
tity Protector between the agent and the rest of its potential partners to
achieve that aim. However, they did not really propose any specific technique
or mechanisms to do so. We base this strategy on the fact that preferences of a
customer can usually be seen as a disjunctive list of specific preferences. Thus,
we propose that customers use a different pseudonym for each disjunctive.
In our framework (see section 3), preferences P are composed of a disjunc-
tive list of preferred models Pmi. One strategy to avoid excessive knowledge of
our preference is to use a pseudonym for each Pmi ∈ P with 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |. The
more preferred models Pmi, the more effective this strategy is. Let us explain
some observations. (1) If the customer is negotiating with a pseudonym asso-
ciated with a preferred model Pmi and the seller offers a product that does
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not fit Pmi but is acceptable considering the totality of the preferences P , the
customer should just ignore such a product, and buy it when she is using the
pseudonym for her part of the preferences corresponding to such product. (2)
This strategy is particularly useful to detect abusive prices imposed by the
seller according to customers’ preferences. This is because the customer can
use a pseudonym to query prices of products associated with other identities.
4.6 Fake preferences
Finally, an intuitive solution to the problem presented in this paper is simply
lying about the preferences. That is, the customer tries to cheat on the seller
by providing fake preferences. The customer can apply this strategy by holding
a unique pseudonym through all of its negotiations with the seller. Then, the
customer can perform actions to provide fake preferences depending on the
specific framework. In our framework, the customer may insert false positives
examples in the data base of the seller requesting not wanted terms, since
the protocol specified in the formal framework, see section 3, allows to fake a
change of mind using the message quit. Of course, the use of other negotiation
protocols may restrict this possibility. If the seller ignored all the products
requested which are not finally purchased, this strategy would be equivalent
to Unique pseudonym. This paper assumes that the seller includes all these fake
changes of mind in the data mining model built, as occurs in many real cases.
In Amazon for example, requesting information about a book does not involve
a sale and the system does not forget the products in which we have been
interested. Note that the remaining strategies also include the preferences given
in all messages even if the protocol shown in figure 1 does not end successfully
(i.e., with the accept message). Note also that a strategy of inserting false
negatives instead of false positives is not practical because the customer does
not know in advance the alternatives that the seller will provide.
5 Evaluation
This section provides experimental results on the effect of the strategies ex-
plained in section 4 for preserving privacy in a multi-agent negotiation based on
the formal framework explained in section 3. In particular, we conducted sev-
eral agent-based simulations using the MASON Multiagent Simulation Toolkit5.
In these simulations, customer and seller agents follow the negotiation proto-
col described in section 3.1 to negotiate the purchase of wines [1,4]. The seller
agent builds preferences models based on the techniques explained in sections
3.2 and 3.3. Besides, customers agents use the strategies presented in section
4 to prevent the seller from obtaining detailed models of their preferences.
5 MASON website cs.gmu.edu/~eclab/projects/mason/
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5.1 Experimental Setting
Agents negotiate types of wine [1,4]. In our simulations, a wine is specified
by the following terms: colour; body; flavour; sugar; and country. The possi-
ble values for each of these attributes are shown in table 1. These fields and
their values come from a well-known ontology [1] and the only difference is a
simplification of the term “region” in the “country” field.
Attribute Values
Colour red, rose, white
Body light, medium, full
Flavour delicate, moderate, strong
Sugar dry, offDry, sweet
Country France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, USA,
Germany, Australia, NewZeeland
Table 1 Wine Attributes.
We performed 100 simulations with a single seller agent negotiating 1000
times with 50 different customers, {C1, C2...C50}. Each customer Ci with 1 ≤
i ≤ 50 has a set of preferences Pi%10 according to the following list with ten
different profiles:
– P0 = ((colour = red) ∧ (body = full)) ∨ ((colour = white) ∧ (body = light))
– P1 = ((colour = red) ∧ (body = light)) ∨ ((colour = white) ∧ (body = medium))
– P2 = ((sugar = sweet) ∧ (country = France)) ∨ ((sugar = dry) ∧ (country = Spain))
– P3 = ((sugar = dry) ∧ (country = France)) ∨ ((sugar = dry) ∧ (country = Italy))
– P4 = ((body = light)∧(flavour = delicate))∨((sugar = dry))∧(country = Portugal))
– P5 = ((body = full) ∧ (flavour = moderate)) ∨ ((sugar = sweet) ∧ (country =
Portugal))
– P6 = ((colour = red)∧ (body = medium)∧ (flavour = moderate))∨ ((colour = rose)∧
(body = light) ∧ (sugar = dry)) ∨ ((colour = white) ∧ (body = full) ∧ (sugar = dry))
– P7 = ((colour = rose)∧(body = medium)∧(flavour = moderate))∨((colour = white)∧
(body = light) ∧ (sugar = dry)) ∨ ((colour = red) ∧ (body = full) ∧ (sugar = dry))
– P8 = ((colour = red) ∧ (body = medium) ∧ (flavour = moderate)) ∨ ((colour =
rose) ∧ (body = full) ∧ (country = Italy))
– P9 = (country = USA) ∨ (country = France)
Besides the 50 customers agents, there is one seller agent which builds
preferences models based on the past interactions with the customers. The
data mining techniques used by the seller to build preferences models are all
specific algorithms of the techniques explained in section 3.3: J48, a decision
tree; NNge, an algorithm of classification rules; NaiveBayes, a Bayes Network
learning algorithm; and MultilayerPerceptron, a multilayer perceptron classi-
fier. The four implementations are open source [7] and have been used with its
default parameters to allow the interested reader to reproduce the results ob-
tained. Note that the paper is not focused on comparing different data mining
techniques but on calculating the benefit of the strategies presented over an
accurate model obtained by data mining. These four algorithms are employed
to prove the generality of the approach presented.
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body = l i g h t
| co l ou r = red : − ( 2 8 . 0 )
| co l ou r = ros e : − ( 2 3 . 0 )
| co l ou r = white : + ( 5 1 . 0 )
body = medium : − ( 9 8 . 0 )
body = f u l l
| co l ou r = red : + ( 4 9 . 0 )
| co l ou r = ros e : − ( 2 5 . 0 )
| co l ou r = white : − ( 2 7 . 0 )
Fig. 2 Preference model using J48. The notation a=v : +/- denotes that “if a has value
v the target is classified as +/-”. Every leaf includes the number of instances classified in
parentheses. If this number includes a fraction, the denominator is the number of instances
incorrectly classified in the training data by the rule from the leaf to the root.
An example of preference model built using J48 is displayed in figure 2.
In particular, it displays a preference model which has been built with the
information provided by the customer C1 throughout 1000 negotiations and
using the control strategy, unique pseudonym. The reader can check that the
decision tree is logically equivalent to the preferences of this customer, P1
(detailed above).
As explained in section 3.2, the assessment of the preference models is
performed by a simple validation using a test set with: a number of positive
examples for each preferred model Pmi ∈ P which satisfy the terms in Pmi;
and a number of negative examples for each preferred model Pmi ∈ P whose
terms do not meet any preference in P . The percentage of correctly classified
instances (CCI) of the test set by the preference model is the accuracy. For
these experiments, the test set is composed of 1000 positive examples of 1000
negative examples.
Finally, some considerations for the implementation of the strategies in
these experiments are detailed here. Pseudonym if model accurate has been
configured with a threshold of 75%. That is, the customer changes its pseudonym
if the agent calculates a CCI greater than this value for the current pseudonym
before starting any negotiation. Pseudonym per group considers a group with
the 50 customers in each negotiation. Fake preferences try to insert 10 false
positives examples as requests in each conversation (if the seller offers the
product requested but unwanted, the customer quits).
5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 3 shows the results for the six strategies and the four mining techniques
studied. The figure shows that, as explained at the end of section 3.2, that
50% of correctly classified instances (CCI) is the best possible outcome since
the simplest model of preferences achieves this result. For “no strategy”, the
decision tree only needs 200 interactions to get accuracy over 99.9%. These
results are repeated for other data mining techniques with the exception of
the Bayesian classifier that only gets about 85% of CCI. Therefore, we can
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establish a CCI of 100% as worst possible outcome, since the seller is able
to successfully predict all customer preferences. Once the best and worst case
have been considered, the effect of the strategies explained in this paper are
discussed and ordered from the worst to the best results:
– Pseudonym if model accurate This strategy obtains the worst results for
all techniques except for the Bayesian classifier where Pseudonym per pref-
erence is slightly worse.
– Pseudonym per preference achieved 73% of CCI in all techniques from 200
negotiations.
– Pseudonym per group gets the best results with the Bayesian classifier,
about 60% of CCI, and no technique reaches 70%.
– Pseudonym per negotiation gets the best results with the decision tree, the
optimal result (50% of CCI). In the other techniques, it gets results slightly
worse than Fake preferences.
– Fake preferences achieves the best results (except for the decision tree).
Specifically, the number of CCI ranges from 50%, which is the best case
possible (with Bayes), and 57% (with NNge).
In the following section, we thoroughly discuss the results obtained in these
experiments.
6 Discussion
With the results obtained, we can conclude that the strategy Fake preferences
is the best one for the case study presented because it improves the results
of Pseudonym per negotiation and it does not require a change of pseudonym
that may involve loss of privileges given by the seller. Of course, as discussed in
section 4, there are cases where the application of this strategy is not feasible
and where some of the proposed alternatives are useful. The worst strategy
studied is Pseudonym if model accurate because the worst CCI is reached.
Moreover, as explained in section 4, this strategy leads to abrupt changes in
the information available to build the preference model.
The customer knows its own preferences and can create a data set to prop-
erly test the model constructed. Nevertheless, the seller has to resort to meth-
ods such as cross-validation [64]. What is the seller’s perspective when the
above strategies are applied to customers?. Figure 4 shows the results of cross
validation for each strategy and using J48 as learning algorithm. Pseudonym
per negotiation does not even appear, since the cross-validation with 10 folds
needs at least 10 instances. Pseudonym if model accurate is the strategy that,
on average, more effectively discourages the seller about the quality of the mod-
els built. Pseudonym per group obtains about 70% of CCI. Fake preferences
80% and Pseudonym per preference over 99% of CCI from 200 negotiations. In
conclusion, while Fake preferences is the best strategy to hinder the seller from
knowing customer preferences, Pseudonym per preference is the best strategy
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Fig. 3 Results for the 6 strategies from the perspective of the customer. Four data mining
techniques are used: decision tree, rule-based classifier, naive Bayesian classifier and multi-
layer perceptron. The lines show the mean for 100 experiments evaluating the preference
model by simple validation (training data composed of 1000 negative cases and 1000 positive
cases). The bar lines show the standard deviation of the mean, often imperceptible. The Y
axis shows the correctly classified instances for a specific data mining technique, and the X
axis the number of negotiations.
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Fig. 5 Results for 100 negotiations using Fake preferences with a different number of
false positives examples and J48 as learning algorithm. The lines show the mean for 100
experiments evaluating the preference model by simple and cross validation. The Y axis
shows the correctly classified instances using simple validation or cross validation, and the
X axis the number of fake elements inserted.
to make sellers think that excellent information about of those preferences has
been gained.
Since the strategy recommended, Fake preferences, requires a parameter
(the number of fake elements inserted), experiments have been conducted to
study the influence of this parameter on the results, see figure 5. The results
are close to the optimum for 10 false positives examples when the simple
validation is used: accuracy of 53%. Using over 19 fake examples the accuracy
is under 51%. The experiments also show that using more fake examples, the
perception of the seller (which uses cross validation) is that the model is more
accurate since much more examples have been provided.
In the same vein, figure 6 shows the effect of the threshold parameter
in the Pseudonym if model accurate strategy. The chart shows that under
50%, this strategy behaves just like Pseudonym per negotiation, i.e. the simple
validation offers around 50% of correctly classified instances. However, it has
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Fig. 6 Results for 100 negotiations using Pseudonym if model accurate giving different
values for the threshold employed to decide when the model is rebuilt. The lines show the
mean for 100 experiments evaluating the preference model by simple and cross validation.
The bar lines show the standard deviation of the mean, often imperceptible. The Y axis
shows the correctly classified instances using simple validation or cross validation, and the
X axis the number of fake elements inserted.
the added computational cost of having to build a preference model before each
negotiation. In these cases, the cross validation cannot be conducted because
at least 10 instances in the training data are needed. Values equal or greater
than 50% disclose more information about the preferences since the model is
rebuilt with less frequency.
Finally, some experiments have been conducted to study the effects of
the strategies studied when customers’ preferences change. Specifically, each
customer Ci with 1 ≤ i ≤ 50 changes her preferences from Pi%10 to Pi+1%10,
according to the list of profiles given in section 5. This change happens in the
negotiation number 200, when, as shown in figure 3, a lack of strategy allows
the seller to classify correctly almost 100% of the instances. Figure 7 details
the results obtained for each strategy. When no strategy is used, the CCI goes
from 99% with 199 instances to 46% with 200. This occurs because, although
the training data only changes in one instance, the evaluation data (generated
with the new customer’s preferences) varies drastically. The strategies with
the best behaviour without preferences changes (see figure 3), Pseudonym per
negotiation and Fake preferences, do not present any significant change because
they never allow the seller to reach a sound theory about their preferences.
Consequently, these strategies are not affected if the preferences are not stable.
This is also the case of Pseudonym per group but for a different reason. Since
the preferences are exchanged according to the same list of profiles and in this
strategy all customers share the same pseudonym, no change is perceived in
the training data. Finally, Pseudonym per preference presents an abrupt CCI
reduction (from 73% to 23%) when preferences change and this value is not
recovered after 500 negotiations (CCI reaches only 72%). This is caused mainly
because the number of preferred models (Pmi, see section 4.5) can be different
in the new customer profile. If the new profile has more preferred models, new
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Fig. 7 Results for the 6 strategies from the perspective of the customer when preferences
change in negotiation 200. The lines show the mean for 100 experiments evaluating the pref-
erence model by simple validation (training data composed of 1000 negative cases and 1000
positive cases). The bar lines show the standard deviation of the mean, often imperceptible.
The Y axis shows the correctly classified instances for a specific data mining technique, and
the X axis the number of negotiations.
pseudonyms are employed and the seller does not have any information about
them. If the new profile has less preferred models, some pseudonyms are not
used after the change, they do not generate new data for the seller, and they
offer very low number of CCI because the evaluation data set has changed
with the preferences.
Given the experiments detailed above, the use of Fake preferences is also
recommended when preferences are not stable. However, Pseudonym per pref-
erence presents the best result at the moment of the change and after a few
negotiations (less than 10 in these experiments). Therefore, another option not
explored in this paper, is to alternate between different strategies during the
history of the interaction with the seller. For example, Pseudonym per pref-
erence could be employed right after a preferences change, and after a while,
the customer might start using Fake preferences.
Of course, the efficacy of the strategies and the quality of the preference
model obtained by the seller depends on many factors, including the semantics
exchanged (in this case wine) and the complexity of the preferences profiles of
customers. Nonetheless, the results for this case study allow us to extrapolate
a number of interesting properties of the strategies presented and hint at their
potential in real domains.
7 Conclusions and future works
Agent-based e-commerce has received much attention in specialized literature.
Specifically, this paper has shown that a large number of works deal with the
problem of obtaining accurate models (or profiles) of customers’ preferences
in order to provide the sellers with more effective negotiation strategies. Since
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these profiles can represent a serious threat to the privacy of customers, this
paper focuses on reviewing and testing strategies to avoid the construction of
these preference models. These strategies are mostly based on the use, reuse,
or change of pseudonyms.
To illustrate the suitability of the strategies for a wide scope of contexts,
this paper has detailed a generic framework to implement a negotiation be-
tween agents, define the preferences of the products negotiated by the cus-
tomers, build a preference model using a generic data mining classifier, and
evaluate this model from customers’ viewpoint.
The six strategies evaluated are: the use of a unique pseudonym, a pseudonym
per negotiation, a pseudonym change if model accurate enough, the use of a
pseudonym per group, a pseudonym per preference, and introducing fake pref-
erences.
The efficacy of these strategies have been tested in a wine trade system.
The conclusion is that adding fake preferences is the best approach to hinder
a seller from building an accurate preference model using the four data mining
techniques considered (a decision tree, a rule-based classifier, a naive Bayesian
classifier, and a multilayer perceptron). On the other hand, if the customer
tries to make the seller think that her model is extremely accurate (when
it is not), the use of a pseudonym per preference gets outstanding results.
Finally, the use of the pseudonym per preference also gives the best results
when preferences change, although fake preferences overcomes it after a few
negotiations.
Given the number of experiments conducted, the results obtained are sta-
tistically sound. We strongly believe that the experimental setting has the
potential to produce very similar results with human users instead of agents.
However, in order to prove this, further work performing experiments with
actual human users is necessary.
As pointed out in different studies [58,59], there is a minority but important
number of people that would be willing to lose privacy in exchange of tailored
advertising or personalised searches. As future work, we plan to use some
of the existing privacy-utility tradeoff frameworks [30] that support decisions
about whether disclosing personal information would be worth the privacy that
would be lost. Thus, the idea would be to decide whether or not to apply the
strategy that maximises the privacy-utility tradeoff at each point in time, i.e.,
it preserves as much privacy as possible while maximising the utility gained.
Finally, our main future work is to test the strategies presented in more
real scenarios. Even when there are plenty of possibilities for using an agent-
based e-commerce environment, we cannot convince enough customers to im-
plement the strategies we have presented in this paper and to produce enough
sales for an assessment with statistical significance. On the other hand, agent-
based simulations, as the ones employed in this paper, are precisely conceived
to study situations where studying the reality is not feasible or simply too
costly. However, to improve the evaluation realism, we are harvesting data
sets from sales produced in electronic commerce environments. Although this
data is static, we plan to preprocess it to reflect the implementation of the
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strategies presented in this paper. For example, by giving distinct customer
identifications in each tuple, we can study the effect of “Unique pseudonym”.
Other strategies will be considerably more challenging. To test “Pseudonym
per preference”, previously, we will have to discover the different customers’
preferences based on the data set. Besides, the error occurred in this process
will be propagated to the evaluation. Other strategies will require assumptions
which lead the experiments, basically, to the simulation approach presented
in this paper. “Fake preferences” will require to simulate fake sales and to in-
troduce them in the data set. Besides, this assessment will always rely on the
assumption that we know the learning algorithms employed by sellers agents.
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